It is well known that economies of scale that are external to the individual decision makers can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and the multiplicity or even indeterminacy of equilibrium. We argue that the importance of this source of multiplicity and indeterminacy is overstated in representative agent models, as they ignore the potential stabilizing effect of heterogeneity. We illustrate this point in a version of Matsuyama's (1991 Matsuyama's ( ,1992 two-sector model with increasing returns to scale. Two main results are shown. First, sufficient homogeneity with respect to individual productivity leads to the instability and non-uniqueness of a given stationary state and the indeterminacy of equilibrium at that stationary state. Second, sufficient heterogeneity leads to the global saddle-path stability and the uniqueness of a given stationary state and the global uniqueness of equilibrium.
Introduction
The uniqueness of equilibrium is crucial in economic analysis. If multiple equilibria exist then the concept of rational expectations equilibrium becomes inconsistent unless an equilibrium selection mechanism can be identified by which non-economic factors, such as cultural conventions or institutional constraints, coordinate individual beliefs and thereby select an equilibrium. Since not much is known about this coordination process, models with multiple equilibria typically do not lead to sharp predictions. Moreover, when there are multiple equilibria, the outcome of comparative static exercises depends crucially on the way in which beliefs are coordinated. This problem becomes worse when there is indeterminacy of equilibrium, that is, when there is an infinite number of equilibria at least one of which is not isolated.
1 In this case, it is impossible to conduct comparative static exercises at all. Another problem with models with multiple equilibria is that it is much harder to compute an equilibrium numerically because when the equilibrium is not unique one in general needs to solve a fixed point problem instead of the planner's problem. For these reasons, it is an important task to identify conditions under which the equilibrium is determinate and conditions under which it is unique.
This paper is about the determinacy and uniqueness of equilibrium when there are economies of scale that are external to the individual decision makers. The presence of such economies of scale leads to a strategic complementarity, implying that beliefs can be selffulfilling and the equilibrium can be non-unique [Cooper and John (1988) ]. More specifically, when all individuals believe that all other individuals will undertake the activity that is subject to increasing returns, they may find it optimal to undertake that activity and thereby indeed increase its returns. The implications of this phenomenon were studied by several authors in models with infinitely lived agents. One strand of that literature shows that self-fulfilling random waves of collective optimism or pessimism can be the source of business cycle fluctuations; see, for example, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) , Gali (1994) , Kiyotaki (1988) , and Woodford (1991) . Another strand demonstrated that optimistic beliefs can becomes selffulfilling in models of economic growth or development; see, for example, Benhabib and Perli (1994) , Benhabib and Gali (1995) , Boldrin and Rustichini (1994) , Krugman (1991) , Matsuyama (1991) , and Pelloni and Waldmann (1998) .
We argue that the likelihood that indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibrium occur is overstated by that literature. The reason is that it employs dynamic general equilibrium models with representative agents and restricts attention to symmetric equilibria. 2 By construction of these models, all individuals are identical, hold the same beliefs and act collectively, implying that the whole population can switch from one equilibrium to another one. This is crucial in the presence of increasing returns. There are at least two reasons why such collective switches may not occur. First, individuals may not be able to coordinate, for example because they face a free-riding problem or because they have heterogeneous information. This has been shown in research independent of ours. In particular, the first point is developed by Adsera and Ray (1998) in a simple dynamic model, in which identical individuals make sectoral choices when returns increase only with a time lag, and the second one is made by Karp (1999) , who applies an idea of Morris and Shin (1998) to a static model of sectoral choice with increasing returns.
Both papers find that modeling the coordination problem rules self-fulfilling equilibria out.
The present paper points out another reason why collective switches may not occur even when there is no a coordination problem: not all agents may find it optimal act upon a change of beliefs, simply because they are heterogeneous with respect to their physical characteristics, e.g. productivity.
3
We study the role of heterogeneity in a version of Matsuyama's (1991 Matsuyama's ( ,1992 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic environment and Section 3 deals with the definition and existence of equilibrium. Heterogeneity is parameterized in Section 4. Section 5 characterizes the effects of changes in heterogeneity and Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
Environment
We use a version of Matsuyama's (1991 Matsuyama's ( ,1992 continuous time overlapping generations economy. It is well suited for our purposes because individuals are different with respect to their productivity. Matsuyama's economy is small and open, there are no barriers to trade, and there are perfect capital and insurance markets, so individuals can freely borrow and lend at the given world real interest rate r > 0 to smooth their consumption. This suppresses general equilibrium effects on prices and allows us to focus on the role that heterogeneity can play.
Technology
There are two sectors, called agriculture and manufacturing, which produce different goods.
Both goods can be traded freely at given world market prices. For simplicity, we assume that their relative price is constant and normalize it to one. The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of measure one. All individuals are taken to be equally productive when they work in agriculture and their endowment of labor services in agriculture is normalized to one. Moreover, in agriculture one unit of labor services is transformed into one unit of the output good, that is, the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. In contrast, it is critical for the purpose of this paper that individuals are differently productive when they work in manufacturing. We capture this by assuming that there are different types i ∈ R that are distributed across the population according to a cumulative distribution function G( · ).
is exogenously given, time invariant, has a finite mean, and a continuous and positive density function g( · ).
Given this assumption, the inverse of G( · ) exists, is continuously differentiable, and maps R onto [0, 1]. We denote it by G −1 ( · ). To give the different types an economic meaning, we assign the endowment of e(i) units of labor services in manufacturing to type-i individuals.
Assumption 2 e( · ) : R → R + is continuously differentiable with e (i) < 0 ∀i ∈ R and has the
This implies that lim i→−∞ e(i) =ē and lim i→∞ e(i) = ē. To avoid confusion, it should be stressed that a lower i is associated with a higher productivity.
5
The technology available in manufacturing has economies of scale that are internal to the sector but external to each individual working there. This is captured by letting individual 5 Two remarks about our modelling choices are at order. First, the reason why we assume e ( · ) < 0, instead of the more natural alternative e ( · ) > 0, is that this will turn out to be more convenient below; see e.g. equation (6). Second, we follow Matsuyama and do not directly index the types by their endowments of labor services. This has the advantage that in Section 5 below we can spread the distribution over types without changing the interval of individual endowments with labor services, i.e. [ē,ē] . Note that our results are unaffected by these choices. output depend on n(t), the number of individuals working in manufacturing at time t. Underlying this specification is the notion that the more agents work in manufacturing the more likely they are to meet, interact, and learn from each other. To ensure analytical tractability, we assume that type i's output in manufacturing when n other individuals work there is given by the separable function y(n, i) = a(n)e(i).
Note that this implies that individual with a larger endowment of labor services are more productive in manufacturing.
and has the range
This implies that a(0) = ā and a(1) =ā. Note that one could alternatively make a( · ) an increasing function of total labor services allocated to manufacturing, like in Matsuyama (1991) , or of total output in manufacturing. We abstain from this for two reasons: first, it is not clear that individuals learn more from each other when average productivity or output are high than when they are low; second, it would complicate the analysis without providing additional insights.
Individuals' Problem
Each individual faces a constant death rate p > 0. If it dies it is replaced by a newborn of the same type. By the law of large numbers, the distribution of types then remains invariant and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
6 At the beginning of its life, each individual makes an irreversible career decision about the sector in which it will work. We assume that it chooses the sector with the larger expected present discounted lifetime income. 7 The relevant 6 There are technical problems concerning of the law of large numbers with a continuum of iid variables; see Feldman and Gilles (1985) and Judd (1985) . However, as Judd (1985) shows, it is always possible to construct a measure such that the law of large number holds. In what follows we take for granted that it holds.
7 Given the assumption that the relative price of the two output goods is one and that individuals can freely trade and borrow on the world markets, this could easily be derived from the newborn's intertemporal problem after the choice of sector, i.e. maximize the expectation of the present discounted value of a standard time separa-information for the newborns' decisions at time t is the path of n, {n(s)} ∞ s=t . Taking it as given and denoting the individual discount rate by ρ, ρ ∈ (0, ∞), the formal condition that individuals of type i born at time t choose to work in manufacturing is
where E t ( · ) denotes the individual expectation at time t. Given that the death rate is p, the probability that an individual born at time t lives at least until time s > t equals exp(−p(s − t)).
Using this (1) can be rewritten to
where V(t) represents the annuity value of the output stream that one unit of labor services produces in manufacturing:
For future reference, note that
Since the distribution of types is over i, we want to rewrite inequality (3) as a condition on i. To this end, we need to extend the definition of e −1 ( · ) so as to allow for the possibility that 1/V(t) is not in the range of e( · ):
ble utility function subject to the instantaneous budget constraints and the no-Ponzi game condition. This would show that expected lifetime utility increases monotonically in expected lifetime income.
Since e( · ) was assumed to be monotonically decreasing, (3) then implies that all newborns of type i ≤ e −1 (1/V(t)) choose to work in manufacturing. Note that this means that the fraction of newborns that choose manufacturing at time t is given by
Competitive Equilibrium
As we have just seen, V(t) contains all information about the future path of n(s) that is relevant to the individuals' problem at time t. Therefore, we can define the equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is an initialn 0 , paths
, and career decisions such that
(ii) at any point in time t, givenV(t) each newborn's career decision maximizes her expected lifetime income, that is, (3) holds;
(iii) the paths {n(t),V(t)} ∞ t=0 are consistent with the newborns' career decisions, that is,V(t) is as in (4) andn(t) satisfieŝ
In words, the consistency requirements (4) and (7) say that the newborns' decisions generate a path forn(t) that is consistent with the path ofV(t) that the newborns take as given when they made their decisions. In particular, equation (7) The equilibrium dynamics of our economy are characterized by the laws of motion for V,
i.e. the annuity value of the income stream from one unit of labor services in manufacturing, and n, i.e. the number of individuals working in manufacturing. 8 Taking the derivatives of (4) and (7) with respect to time, we get the following two non-linear first-order differential
(8a) is a standard asset pricing relation, which is best seen by rewriting it to V = a(n) +V/(ρ + p), that is, the asset price equals the dividends plus the present value of the capital gain. The dynamics of n reflect that during a small interval of time a fraction p of the individuals working in manufacturing die while a fraction F(V) of the newborns enter manufacturing.
It is important to realize that (n, V) remain in the compact set
This has the implication that for each pair (n 0 ,V 0 ) of initial values, the system (8) has a unique solution;
see Theorems 1.0.1 and 1.0.3 in Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) . To avoid confusion it should be stressed that many of these solutions violate the equilibrium conditions, so we still need to show that for eachn 0 an equilibrium exists. This will be done in Lemma 2 below.
A stationary state of the economy is a pair (n * , V * ) such that all variables are constant over time. Since we are in a small open economy, consumption is only constant in stationary state if the world interest rate, r, equals the effective discount rate, ρ + p.
Using (8), the conditions for a stationary state are found to bė
To ensure that an interior stationary state exists, we assume that 8 In what follows we will drop the time index whenever this is unlikely to cause confusion. 
Assumption 5 Either one or the other of the following two relations holds:
In economic terms Assumption 5 (a) implies that some newborns are so productive [unproductive] (ii) Assumption 5 (a) implies that there cannot be a stationary state at a corner, that is, n = 0 or n = 1 cannot occur in stationary state.
(iii) Assumption 5 (b) implies that both corners are stationary states, that is, (0, ā ) and (1,ā)
are stationary states.
Proof. To prove part (i), recall that a(0) = ā and a(1) =ā. Moreover, since g( · ) > 0 on R,
we know that F −1 (0) = 1/ē and F −1 (1) = 1/ē. Assumption 5 together with the continuity of F −1 ( · ) and a( · ) then imply that theṅ = 0 locus and theV = 0 locus intersect at least once, that is, there is at least one interior stationary state.
Parts (ii) and (iii) follow from the way in which the dynamic forces operate in our economy.
In particular, (9b) shows that to have a stationary state with n = 0 [n = 1] one must have
On the other hand, if Assumption 5b holds then both equations in (9) are satisfied for (0, ā) and (1,ā), that is, the corners are stationary states.
The results of the Lemma are illustrated by Figure 1 . Note that generically there is an odd number of stationary states, the stability properties of which alternate. More precisely, the stationary state with the smallest n, S l , is saddle-path stable, the next one, S m is unstable and so on and so forth. While each stationary state S = (n * , V * ) is an equilibrium for the initial conditionn 0 = n * , the next lemma shows that there is an equilibrium for each initial condition
Lemma 2 (Existence of Equilibrium) If Assumptions 1-5 hold, then for eachn 0 ∈ (0, 1) there is an equilibrium {n(t),V(t)} ∞ t=0 withn(0) =n 0 .
Proof. We start the proof by noting three facts. First, standard index theorems imply that the stationary state with the smallest n * must be saddle-path stable, the next one (as n * increases) must be unstable, followed by a saddle-path stable stationary state and so forth. (0) such that (n 0 ,V(0)) lie on a stable manifold. The unique solution to the dynamical system (8) with initial values (n 0 ,V(0)) then is an equilibrium path with initialn 0 .
Since a newborn's career decision depends on how many individuals will work in manufacturing, the model has a strategic complementarity [Cooper and John (1988) (i) The equilibrium is unique atn(t) ifV(t) is the only V ∈ [ā ,ā] for which (n(t), V) is on an equilibrium path.
9 The differentiability of the stable manifold follows from the Stable Manifold Theorem; see Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983) . Note that application of the Stable Manifold Theorem requires that all eigenvalues have non-zero real parts. Linearizing (8) shows that the eigenvalues have the form λ 1,2 = ρ ± ρ 2 − 4D/2, where D is the determinant of the linearized system. Since ρ > 0 was assumed, all eigenvalues have non-zero real part.
10 Otherwise uniqueness would be violated if one started at the crossing point.
11 Note that we do not require the spreads to be mean preserving. If we did then our definition would be equivalent to first-order stochastic dominance. 
(ii) The equilibrium is determinate atn(t) if it is isolated, that is, there exists an ε > 0 such thatV(t) is the only V ∈ (V(t) − ε,V(t) + ε) for which (n(t), V) is on an equilibrium path.
Note that determinacy (multiplicity of equilibrium) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium (indeterminacy).
Parametrization of Heterogeneity
We restrict attention to those changes in heterogeneity that correspond to spreads of the original distribution function. Borrowing from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , the formal definition is as follows:
Definition 3 (Increase in Heterogeneity) Let G 1 ( · ) and G 2 ( · ) be two distribution functions 
, that is, there is a single crossing point i c such that
If G 2 ( · ) is a spread of G 1 ( · ) then G 1 ( · ) is a shrink of G 2 ( · ) and there is more homogeneity under G 1 ( · ) than under G 2 ( · ).
In general, a distribution and its spread can have more than one crossing point. We consider only spreads and shrinks with a single crossing point because this allows us to parameterize them in the following parsimonious way:
The idea underlying this construction is illustrated by Figure 3 . It is straightforward to prove Lemma 3 (Spreads and Shrinks) Let G( · ) be a distribution with support R. If α ∈ (0, 1),
The parameter α measures the change in heterogeneity relative to the original distribution G( · ). The lower is α the more heterogeneous is the population, whereas the higher it is the more homogeneous is the population.
Our strategy for investigating the effects of changes in heterogeneity will be to pick a specific interior stationary state, denoted by (n * , V * ), and then to change heterogeneity in such a way that (n * , V * ) remains a stationary state for all α ∈ (0, ∞) when i is distributed according to G( · |α, i c ). The next lemma shows how we can achieve this.
Lemma 4 (Invariance of Stationary States under Spreads) If (n * , V * ) is an interior stationary state when i is distributed according G( · ) then for all α ∈ (0, ∞) it remains a stationary state when i is distributed according to G( · |α, e −1 (V * )).
Proof. The claim follows from (9). In particular, (9a) shows that theV = 0 locus does not depend on α at all. In contrast, from (9b) it follows that theṅ = 0 locus remains invariant at n * when α changes if and only if
Since i c is the only crossing point of the two spreads, this implies that to ensure that (n * , V * )
remains a stationary state we have to choose i c = e −1 (1/V * ).
For future reference it is useful to generalize the notation introduced in (6) to the class of spreads just defined:
5 Ruling out Multiplicity and Indeterminacy: the Role of
Heterogeneity
In this section, we investigate analytically the relationship between the amount of heterogeneity across individuals and the determinacy and uniqueness of equilibrium. As a by-product,
we also obtain a characterization of the effects of changes in heterogeneity on the stability and the uniqueness of the chosen interior stationary state, (n * , V * ). The first two Propositions focus on the local properties of (n * , V * ) and the equilibrium. They hold for Assumption 5 (a)
as well as for Assumption 5b. In contrast, Proposition 3 makes global statements and requires Assumption 5a to be true.
Proposition 1 (Saddle-Path Stability of (n * , V * )) Suppose Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied,
is an interior stationary state of the economy when i is distributed according to G( · ),
The stability properties of (n * , V * ) are as follows:
saddle-path stable;
(ii) if α ∈ (ᾱ 1 , ∞) and i is distributed according to G( · |α,
Proof. We know from the Stable Manifold Theorem that if a stationary state is hyperbolic (i.e. has no eigenvalues with zero real part) then the stability properties of the linearized system close to that stationary state are the same as those of the non-linear one. 13 So we replace G( · )
by G( · |α, e −1 (1/V * )) in equations (8) and linearize the resulting system of equations around the chosen interior stationary state (n * , V * ). Noting that
12 The potential stabilizing effect of heterogeneity is not unknown in economics. Grandmont (1992) , for instance, shows that heterogeneous preferences can ensure that the aggregate demand curve is well behaved. To our knowledge, however, it has not previously been investigated how heterogeneity affects the stability properties in a dynamic model. 13 A precise statement of the theorem can for instance be found on page 13 in Guckenheimer and Holmes (1983). we find
which has the determinant
The eigenvalues of the characteristic equation are
Note that as long as ρ ∈ (0, 1), which is assumed, the eigenvalues have non-zero real parts and the Stable Manifold Theorem can be applied.
For all α ∈ (0,ᾱ 1 ) the determinant (15a) is negative and (n * , V * ) is locally saddle-path stable. The determinant is positive for all α ∈ (ᾱ 1 , ∞). Since it is impossible in our model that both eigenvalues are negative, they must then both be real and positive or be complex conjugates with a positive real part. In both cases (n * , V * ) is unstable.
It is interesting to observe from (12) that if (n * , V * ) is initially locally saddle-path stable (unstable) then increasing heterogeneity (homogeneity) does not change this. Another way of saying this is that if (n * , V * ) is initially locally saddle-path stable (unstable) then the threshold α 1 at which the stability properties change is larger (smaller) than one. Next, we turn to the determinacy properties of the equilibrium close to the chosen interior stationary state (n * , V * ).
Proposition 2 (Determinacy of Equilibrium close to (n * , V * )) Suppose Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied, (n * , V * ) is an interior stationary state of the economy when i is distributed according to G( · ), andᾱ
The determinacy properties of equilibrium close to (n * , V * ) are as follows:
(i) if α ∈ (0,ᾱ 2 ) and i is distributed according to G( · |α, e −1 (1/V * )) then (n * , V * ) and all equilibria with (n(t),V(t)) sufficiently close to (n * , V * ) are determinate at thesen(t);
(ii) if α ∈ (ᾱ 2 , ∞) and i is distributed according to G( · |α,
Proof. Recall that linearizing the dynamics at (n * , V * ) leads to (14). So, (15a) and (15b) imply that the roots of (14) are real if and only if α ∈ (0,ᾱ 2 ). They are complex conjugates if and only if α ∈ (ᾱ 2 , ∞). If the roots are real then there is an ε > 0 such that any equilibrium which has (n(t),V(t)) ∈ (n * − ε, n * + ε) × (V * − ε, V * + ε) is determinate at thesen(t). Note that this means, in particular, that the stationary state equilibrium (n * , V * ) is determinate. On the other hand, if α ∈ (ᾱ 2 , ∞) and the roots are complex then the manifold originating in (n * , V * )
"spirals out of" (n * , V * ), which is illustrated by Figure 2 . In this case, the chosen stationary
The results of Propositions 1 and 2 are illustrated by Figure 4 . To develop some intuition, note that (9b) and (13) imply that the slope of theṅ = 0 locus at the chosen interior stationary state is given as
Thus, changing heterogeneity by changing α affects the slope of theṅ = 0 locus. More specifically, since the first fraction of (17) is positive, small α's make theṅ = 0 locus at (n * , V * ) steeper than theV = 0 locus, that is, (n * , V * ) is locally saddle-path stable, which implies the determinacy of equilibrium close to (n * , V * ). The opposite statement holds true for large α's.
In economic terms, changing α such that (n * , V * ) remains a stationary state changes the mass of individuals with endowments of labor services in manufacturing close to 1/V * . For large α, there are relatively many such individuals. If returns are sufficiently strongly increasing beliefs can then be self-fulfilling: if all individuals with endowments of labor services close to 1/V * believe that all the others with similar endowments are going to enter manufacturing, that will increase output in manufacturing by enough to make it attractive for all them It is interesting to observe from (12) and (16) that the amount of heterogeneity necessary to obtain determinacy depends on how strongly returns are increasing, on the effective discount rate, r = ρ+ p, and on the probability of death, p. If returns are strongly increasing (i.e. a ( · ) is relatively large) or if individuals discount the future at a low rate (i.e. r is small) then the entry of fewer individuals into manufacturing can already make beliefs self-fulfilling. Moreover, if the death rate p is relatively large, a relatively large number of newborns makes a decision at any point in time and the previous two effects get amplified. In all cases, more heterogeneity is required (i.e.ᾱ 2 falls) to rule out the possibility of self-fulfilling beliefs and bring about determinacy.
Since the results of Propositions 1 and 2 only hold close to a chosen stationary state, our next task is to investigate under which conditions we can make global statements. It turns out that this is possible only when we have Assumption 5 (a).
Proposition 3 (Uniqueness and Global Saddle-path Stability) Suppose Assumptions 1-5 (a) are satisfied and (n * , V * ) is an interior stationary state of the economy when i is distributed according to G( · ). There exists a uniqueᾱ 3 ∈ (0,ᾱ 1 ] withᾱ 1 defined in (12) such that:
(i) if α ∈ (0,ᾱ 3 ) and i is distributed according to G( · |α, e −1 (1/V * )) then:
• (n * , V * ) is the unique stationary state;
• (n * , V * ) is globally saddle-path stable;
• the equilibrium is unique for all initialn 0 ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) if α ∈ (ᾱ 3 , ∞) and i is distributed according to G( · |α, e −1 (1/V * )) then (n * , V * ) is one of multiple stationary states.
Proof. We start with part (i). First, we prove by contradiction that there exists an α such that the chosen stationary state (n * , V * ) is unique. So, suppose that this is false. Then for any j ∈ N there must be an α j ∈ (0, 1/2 j ) such that the economy with i distributed according to G · |α j , e −1 (1/V * ) has two stationary states, (n * , V * ) and (n * * (α j ), V * * (α j )). Since all stationary states must satisfy (9), we have
Hence,
Furthermore, the construction of the spread given by equation (10) implies
14 Notice that Assumption 5 implies [1/ā, 1/ā] ⊂ [ē,ē] ensuring that e −1 1/a(n) is well defined for all n ∈ [0, 1].
15 Figure 3 also illustrates this. G −1 (n * ) and G −1 n * * (α j )|α j , e −1 (1/V * ) correspond to i c and i in the figure, respectively.
Since
Combining (18) and (20) and recalling that α j > 1/2 j , this gives
(21) is contradicted and our proof by contradiction is completed if we can show that there is a κ ∈ (0, ∞) such that for all n 1 , n 2 ∈ [0, 1] with n 1 n 2
To see this, note first that e −1 (1/a( · )) is continuously differentiable and monotonically increasing. Hence, for all n 1 , n 2 ∈ [0, 1] n 1 n 2 we have
Since G −1 ( · ) is differentiable and g( · ) is a positive and bounded density function, we also have that for all n 1 , n 2 ∈ [0, 1]
(22) follows immediately by dividing (23) by (24) and setting
and noticing that κ ∈ (0, ∞). Since (21) and (22) contradict each other, this shows that there must exist an α for which the chosen stationary state (n * , V * ) is unique.
Next, we show that there is aᾱ 3 such that for all α <ᾱ 3 the chosen stationary state is unique and for all α >ᾱ 3 it is not unique. From the previous step we know that the set of α's for which the economy has multiple stationary states has the positive lower bound 1/κ. This implies that the infimum of that set exists and is positive. We call that infimumᾱ 3 . From (9b) it then follows that the slope of theṅ = 0 locus increases everywhere as α decreases. Since theV = 0 locus does not depend on α, the number of stationary states is non-decreasing in α.
Hence, if theV = 0 and theṅ = 0 locus intersect more than once (exactly once) for someα then they interest more than once (exactly once) for all α >α (α <α). But this means that for all α ∈ (0,ᾱ 3 ) the chosen stationary state is unique, whereas for all α ∈ (ᾱ 3 , ∞) it is not, which proves part (ii) of the proposition.
To show the saddle-path stability part of claim (i), observe that from (15a) it follows that the chosen stationary state (n * , V * ) is locally saddle-path stable iff
The uniqueness of (n * , V * ) for α ∈ (0,ᾱ 2 ) implies that theṅ = 0 locus crosses theV = 0 locus exactly once. Therefore, as (n * , V * ) is a crossing point, it must be the only one. So, since F −1 0|α, e −1 (1/V * ) = 1/ē > ā = a(0), theV = 0 locus is flatter than theṅ = 0 locus in (n * , V * ). This is equivalent to (26).
To complete the proof of part (i), we still need to show that if the chosen stationary state is unique and locally saddle-path stable then it is globally saddle-path stable too. This can be seen in two steps. First, the saddle-path cannot start anywhere but at the boundary, the reason being that any other starting point would be another stationary state and thus contradict uniqueness. Second, the dynamics represented by the arrows on Figure 1b imply that any path starting at the boundary and reaching theV = 0 (ṅ = 0) locus at some V V * (n n * )
can never reach (n * , V * ). Therefore, the chosen stationary state is globally saddle-path stable.
Note that uniqueness and global saddle-path stability implies that for eachn 0 ∈ [0, 1] there is a uniqueV(0) such that the unique solution to the system (8) with initial conditions (n 0 ,V(0)) is a subset of the stable manifold. In other words, the equilibrium is unique if α ∈ (0,ᾱ 2 ) .
Finally, we have not yet shown thatᾱ 3 ≤ᾱ 1 . This follows from Proposition 1 (which said that (n * , V * ) is unstable for all α ∈ (ᾱ 1 , ∞)) and the fact that (n * , V * ) is unique for all α ∈ (0,ᾱ 2 ). Since we have just seen that an unstable stationary cannot be unique, we must haveᾱ 3 ≤ᾱ 1 .
Recalling thatᾱ Increasing heterogeneity spreads out individual characteristics and so increases the masses of both types. Hence, enough heterogeneity makes the chosen stationary state unique and saddlepath stable and the equilibrium unique. In graphical terms, enough heterogeneity makes thė n = 0 curve so steep in the relevant area that it intersects exactly once with theV = 0 curve; see Figure 6 .
Conclusion
This paper has used a two-sector model with increasing returns to scale and overlapping agents to study the possible effects of changes in the heterogeneity of individual productivity characteristics. We have proceeded by choosing one interior stationary state and then spreading the distribution of individual productivity in such a way that this interior stationary state remains invariant. For a given set of preference and technology parameters and a relatively homogeneous population, we have found that the model has multiple stationary states (at least one of which is unstable) and that the chosen stationary state is an indeterminate equilibrium.
While for intermediate amounts of heterogeneity there are still multiple stationary states, the equilibrium becomes determinate close to the chosen stationary state. We also have shown that for sufficient heterogeneity the chosen stationary state is unique and globally saddle-path stable and the equilibrium is unique. This suggests that representative agent versions of dynamic general equilibrium models with increasing returns to scale overstate the likelihood with which multiplicity, or even indeterminacy, of equilibrium occurs.
An obvious question to ask at the end of this paper is whether sufficient heterogeneity can bring about determinacy and uniqueness of equilibrium also in frameworks different from ours. The results of independent research of Frankel and Pauzner (2000) and Morris and Shin (1998) They found that if speculators have different information about the state of the economy, the equilibrium can become unique. The basic intuition is again related to that of this paper:
heterogeneity in terms of information ensures that the mass of speculators that are willing to attack the currency is never sufficiently large for self-fulfilling beliefs to occur.
Future research will have to show whether multiplicity and indeterminacy can be ruled out through certain forms of heterogeneity also in different contexts.
